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In this chapter we evaluate the ﬁscal and distributive impact of social se-
curity reform in the United Kingdom. To examine this, we consider three
reforms to the state pension system, all designed to increase the retirement
age by changing the incentive structure underlying the pension system. We
analyze both the mechanical ﬁscal eﬀects of implementing the reforms
without allowing for behavioral responses as well as the full eﬀects that ad-
ditionally account for an individual’s altering his or her retirement deci-
sions in light of the reformed pension system. To address the behavioral
eﬀects we use a transition model of retirement that is based on microdata
from the UK Retirement Survey. This model is developed in Blundell,
Meghir, and Smith (2001), and we adapt that speciﬁcation in this paper to
provide simulations on individual data of pension reforms. Before describ-
ing the reforms and the simulation model, we introduce this study with
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form in the United Kingdom.
In line with other OECD countries, the United Kingdom will experience
population ageing over the next few decades and a growth in the propor-
tion of people aged 65 and over relative to the working-age population.
However, this process is not likely to be as dramatic in the United Kingdom
as it is predicted to be in Germany, Italy, or Japan. The ﬁnancial sustain-
ability of the state pension system is not a substantive issue. Indeed, under
current pension rules, the burden of state pensions is projected by the gov-
ernment to fall slightly as a percentage of national income, from 5.1 per-
cent in 2001–2002 to around 4.8 percent by 2050–2051. Figure 11.1 also
shows that expenditure on the basic state pension is forecast to fall as a
share of national income. Expenditure on the State Earnings-Related Pen-
sion Scheme (SERPS) and the State Second Pension is forecast to rise, but
by far less than would have been the case under the initial SERPS, intro-
duced in 1978. This is a consequence of a series of reforms to the pension
system in the 1980s that dramatically reduced its generosity.1 There is also
an increase in forecast expenditure on the Minimum Income Guarantee
and Pension Credit entitlement, both of which are means tested.2
In contrast, the trend in the 1970s was toward a more generous state pen-
sion system. The main element of the state pension system, the basic state
pension, was increased each year, in line with the greater of the increase in
earnings or prices. In 1978 a new second-tier earnings-related pension
(SERPS) was introduced, which was originally intended to pay a pension
worth 25 percent of an individual’s best 20 years of earnings. However,
SERPS was never a universal scheme for all employees. Workers who be-
longed to a deﬁned-beneﬁt occupational pension could opt out of SERPS
(and pay lower rates of National Insurance) so long as their occupational
scheme guaranteed at least the same pension as SERPS. (In fact, until
1988, employers were allowed to make membership of their occupational
pension scheme a condition of employment). At the time that SERPS was
introduced more than half of all employees, and more than two-thirds of
male employees, were opted out of the state scheme.3
It is worth bearing in mind that spending on pensions represents only
part of total government spending on beneﬁts for older nonworkers. In the
1980s, there was a very large increase in the number of older nonworkers
on disability beneﬁts4 (see Tanner 1998), and spending on these beneﬁts
has more than doubled in real terms since 1990. As the level of the basic
state pension is below the level of means-tested beneﬁts for pensioners,
460 Richard Blundell and Carl Emmerson
1. See Emmerson and Johnson (2002) for more details.
2. This is discussed further in Clark and Emmerson (2003).
3. For more details of the contracting out of arrangements and their impact see, for ex-
ample, Disney, Emmerson, and Smith (2003).
4. The main beneﬁt was invalidity beneﬁt, which was replaced by incapacity beneﬁt in 1995.many pensioners are eligible for means-tested beneﬁts on top of their state
pension. By April 2003 more than half of families with an individual aged
60 or over were entitled to means-tested beneﬁts.5 Means testing is contin-
uing to be an increasingly important element in state provision for pen-
sioners, with the introduction of an earnings-indexed means-tested Pen-
sion Credit since October 2003.
Since the early 1980s, successive reforms have cut back the generosity of
the state pension provision. The greater of growth in prices or earnings
lasted only until November 1980, since when it has been formally indexed
to prices and has fallen relative to average earnings. Reforms to SERPS in-
troduced in 1986 and 1995 have reduced its generosity for anyone reaching
the state pension age after 2000. Also, the state pension age for women, cur-
rently 60, is set to increase to 65 by 2020. These reforms were coupled with
further encouragement for individuals to make private provision for their
pension. The most important change was to give individuals the choice to
opt out of SERPS into a deﬁned contribution scheme from 1988 (or alter-
natively, to leave their employer’s deﬁned-beneﬁt scheme and join either a
deﬁned-contribution pension or return to SERPS). In practice, this meant
a growth in individual retirement accounts (personal pensions) and the de-
velopment of deﬁned-contribution occupational pensions. The growth in
personal pensions was rapid. By the early 1990s they covered nearly one-
quarter of employees and an even higher proportion of younger workers.
The UK government is currently considering further pension reform.
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5. See table 4.2 of Banks, Blundell, Disney, and Emmerson (2002).
Fig. 11.1 Projected state spending on pensions in the UKWhile the United Kingdom does not have a public ﬁnance problem in terms
of future expected state expenditures (at least under the current settle-
ment), there is concern that some individuals might not be making suf-
ﬁcient private provision for their retirement. The latest proposals are to
preserve the average per-pensioner generosity of state pensions at roughly
their current level. In part, this would be ﬁnanced through an increase in
the state pension age to 68 by the middle of this century, although the pro-
portion of national income spent on transfer payments to pensioners
would still be projected to rise by 1.5 percent of national income over the
next ﬁfty years. The government has also proposed defaulting all employ-
ees into a private pension scheme—with (unless they choose to leave the
scheme) a compulsory employer contribution worth 3 percent of salary.
Reforms aimed at increasing retirement ages, and therefore improving the
adequacy of retirement provision, are also being implemented.6
In fact, like many other OECD countries, the United Kingdom has been
experiencing a trend toward earlier labor market exits among older, par-
ticularly male, workers. The percentage of employed men aged 60 to 64
halved from 1968, when over 80 percent were employed, to a little over 40
percent in 1996.7 The fall in the proportion of older men who were in full-
time employment was even greater than the fall in the proportion in any
form of employment, with a relative shift within the employed to self-
employment and part-time employment. Female employment has not ex-
perienced the same downward trend—but this contrasts with rising par-
ticipation among most other age groups of females across the same period.
Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2001) looked at the extent to which these
labor market trends might be explained by the ﬁnancial incentives in the
pension system that people faced when making their retirement decisions.
In doing so, they focused not only on the pensions provided by the state,
but also on employer-provided pensions and on other state beneﬁts, such
as invalidity beneﬁt, both of which have played a crucial role in the United
Kingdom. They found signiﬁcant accrual and pension wealth eﬀects, re-
ﬂecting the substitution and wealth eﬀects of pension systems on the in-
centive to retire.
Compared to many other European countries, the United Kingdom
stands out as having a high level of coverage of private pensions and, at
least in recent years, a trend toward less generous state pension provision.
The models of retirement behavior estimated in the Blundell, Meghir, and
Smith study fully account for the incentives underlying private occupa-
tional schemes, and those estimates are used in this chapter to analyze the
ﬁscal impact of pension reform.
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6. Proposals recently implemented are set out in Department for Work and Pensions (2002)
and discussed in Emmerson and Wakeﬁeld (2003). The latest proposals are contained in De-
partment for Work and Pensions(2006) and are discussed in Emmerson, Tellow, and Wakeﬁeld
(2006).
7. See Banks, Blundell, Disney, and Emmerson (2002) or Disney and Hawkes (2003).The plan of the chapter is as follows. The next section describes the UK
pension system and the key elements that are likely to aﬀect retirement be-
havior. Section 11.3 presents the basic empirical model we use to simulate
the behavioral eﬀects of pension reform. Section 11.4 describes the simu-
lation methodology and the set of policy reforms. In section 11.5 the sim-
ulation results from three policy reforms designed to reduce the incentives
for early retirement in the current pension system are presented. Section
11.6 concludes.
11.2 Institutional Features of the UK State Pension Scheme
The UK pension system is three-tiered. Figure 11.2provides a summary
diagram of these three tiers. A more detailed discussion can be found in
Banks and Emmerson (2000). The ﬁrst tier, provided by the state, consists
of the basic state pension and a signiﬁcant level of means-tested beneﬁts
(made more signiﬁcant by the introduction of the Minimum Income Guar-
antee for those aged 60 and over in April 1999). The second tier, compul-
sory for all employees with earnings above a certain ﬂoor, is made up of the
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme8and a large and continually grow-
ing level of private provision. Finally, there is a third tier consisting of ad-
ditional voluntary contributions and other private insurance.
11.2.1 The Basic State Pension
The basic state pension is a ﬂat-rate contributory beneﬁt payable to
people aged over the state pension age (65 for men and 60for women9) who
have made suﬃcient contributions throughout their working lives.10 In
April 2003, the basic state pension was worth £77.45 a week for a single
pensioner. Prior to 1978, married women could opt to pay a reduced rate
of National Insurance, which meant they did not qualify for a basic state
pension in their own right. Couples in which one partner does not qualify
for the basic state pension receive a dependant addition, irrespective of
whether they have ever worked. Since 1989 there has been no earnings test
for receipt of the basic state pension.11 Individuals who choose to defer
their state pension currently receive an additional 1 percent for every seven
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8. The State Second Pension replaced SERPS in April 2002. This is more generous to lower
earners. For a discussion see, for example, Agulnik (1999) or Disney, Emmerson, and Tanner
(1999).
9. The state pension age for women will be raised by six months each year from 2010 to 2020
so that equalization is achieved in 2020.
10. To qualify for the basic state pension, individuals need to have made or be credited with
National Insurance contributions for 90 percent of their working lives. Credits are available
for periods of illness, disability, or unemployment. Since the introduction of Home Respon-
sibilities Protection in 1978, the number of years of contributions required can be reduced by
time spent caring for children or another dependent.
11. See Disney and Smith (2002) for a discussion of the eﬀects of the abolition of the earn-
ings test on labor supply.weeks of deferral, and from April 2006 this has been increased to 1 percent
for every ﬁve weeks.
11.2.2 The State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS)
The ﬁrst part of the second tier of pension provision is the State Earn-
ings-Related Pension Scheme. Introduced in 1978, this pays a pension
equal to a fraction of an individual’s qualifying annual earnings (above a
speciﬁed lower earnings limit) each year since 1978. When it was intro-
duced, SERPS was intended to pay a pension worth one quarter of an in-
dividual’s best twenty years’ earnings (up to a speciﬁed upper earnings
limit). Subsequent reductions in the generosity of SERPS mean that it will
eventually only be worth 20 percent of average lifetime earnings. Married
women who opted to pay reduced-rate National Insurance contributions
do not qualify for SERPS. Currently widows can claim their husbands’
SERPS pensions in full if they receive no additional pension in their own
right.12 After retirement, the SERPS pension is uprated each year in line
with price ﬂuctuation.
11.2.3 Income Support and Invalidity Beneﬁt
In addition to the basic state pension and SERPS, there are two other
state beneﬁts that are widely taken up by older nonworkers—income sup-
port and incapacity beneﬁt (formerly invalidity beneﬁt). Income support is
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12. This was due to be reduced to half from April 2000. However, the failure of the govern-
ment to properly inform individuals of the change in entitlement led to the reform being de-
layed.
Fig. 11.2 The UK pension system, 1990a ﬂat rate, noncontributory means-tested beneﬁt. It is payable to those who
are on low incomes and are not in paid employment. Unlike people in
younger age groups, those aged 60 and over do not have to show that they
are actively seeking work in order to qualify. From April 1999, income sup-
port for pensioners was renamed the Minimum Income Guarantee and
made more generous with an increase in the level and a commitment to up-
rate in line with earnings, at least for the short-to-medium term. The gen-
erosity of means-tested beneﬁts was extended further with the introduction
of the pension credit in October 2003, which will be payable to lower-
income individuals aged 65 or over.13
Incapacity beneﬁt is a contributory beneﬁt paid to the long-term sick
and disabled. Incapacity beneﬁt can only be received by individuals aged
under the state pension age. In the case of invalidity beneﬁt, an individual
qualiﬁed on the basis of medical certiﬁcates from their doctor showing
them to be incapable of work that was reasonable to expect them to do
(given their age, qualiﬁcations, etc.). With the introduction of incapacity
beneﬁt in 1995 this was changed to the stricter all work test carried out by
a doctor employed by the Beneﬁts Agency Medical Service. The change
from invalidity beneﬁt to incapacity beneﬁt was a response to very rapid
growth in receipt of beneﬁts during the 1980s. A key feature of incapacity
beneﬁt (and invalidity beneﬁt) is that, before April 2001, it was not means
tested and could be received in conjunction with private pension income
(unlike income support). Since April 2001, it has been means tested against
individual occupational pension income.
11.2.4 Occupational and Personal Pensions
Compared to most other European countries, the United Kingdom has
a high level of coverage of private pensions, including both occupational
pensions and individual retirement accounts, known in the United King-
dom as Personal Pensions. Any employee can choose to contract out of
SERPS and into one of these two types of secondary private pension.
(From April 2001, people have also been able to choose to opt out into a
stakeholder pension, which is eﬀectively a benchmarked individual retire-
ment account.) Members of deﬁned-beneﬁt and deﬁned-contribution oc-
cupational schemes pay a reduced rate of National Insurance, while those
with personal or stakeholder pensions receive a National Insurance rebate
paid directly into their fund.
In 2000, occupational pensions covered 10.1 million individuals, down
from 11 million in the mid-1980s. They are typically deﬁned-beneﬁt
schemes (see table 11.1), although since 1988 employees have also been al-
lowed to opt out into deﬁned-contribution occupational schemes, and
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13. For an explanation of the pension credit, its impact on savings incentives, and the im-
plications of earnings indexation to eligibility over time, see Clark and Emmerson (2003).there has been a gradual shift from DB to DC schemes since then (see
Disney and Stears 1996). The decline in coverage of occupational pension
plans is due to a number of factors. It reﬂects changing employment pat-
terns and a shift to employers who employ fewer workers. Also, it reﬂects
increasing pension choice among individuals working for employers oﬀer-
ing occupational pensions who, since 1988, can no longer be compelled to
join the scheme.
Since 1988, individuals have been able to contract out of SERPS (and
leave their occupational scheme) and take out a personal pension. To kick-
start these schemes when they were introduced, a bonus National Insur-
ance contribution of 2 percent was paid by the government, in addition to
the contracted-out rebate. By the mid-1990s, around 6 million people
(more than one quarter of all employees) had taken out a personal pen-
sion. Take-up was higher among younger workers, as would be expected.
However, there is a serious issue over the number of older workers who
were mis-sold personal pensions by ﬁnancial advisers who wrongly ad-
vised them that they would be better oﬀleaving their occupational pension
plan.
Table 11.2summarizes labor market participation and income receipt by
age, using data from the Family Expenditure Survey of 1994–1995 (corre-
sponding to the second wave of the Retirement Survey). It shows relatively
high rates of labor market withdrawal among men before the state pension
age. The two most important sources of income before state pension age
are income from private (predominantly occupational) pensions and dis-
ability beneﬁt. It is important to stress that these two sources of income are
not always alternative preretirement income sources, but are typically re-
ceived together by the same people. The fact that disability beneﬁt was not
means tested meant that it could be received in conjunction with other
forms of income. Three-quarters of people in receipt of disability beneﬁt
income also received some money from a private pension.
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Table 11.1 Occupational schemes: Deﬁned beneﬁt versus deﬁned contribution
Private sector Public sector
schemes schemes All schemes
Number of members (in millions):
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans 4.6 4.5 9.1
Deﬁned contribution planes 0.9 — 0.9
Hybrid schemes 0.1 — 0.1
Total 5.7 4.5 10.1
Percent of members in each type:
Deﬁned beneﬁt plans 81 100 90
Deﬁned contribution planes 16 — 9
Hybrid schemes 2 — 1
Total 100 100 100
Source: Table 3.2 of Government Actuary’s Department (2003).11.3 The Basic Empirical Model
The simulated responses used in this chapter are based on the retirement
model presented in Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2002). This model was es-
timated using the UK Retirement Survey, and in this section we brieﬂy re-
view the model and speciﬁcation of pension incentives. We also present the
estimated model that is used in the simulations.14
11.3.1 The Data
The main data used for analyzing retirement behavior are drawn from
the UK Retirement Survey (RS), a household panel survey collected by the
Oﬃce for Population and Census Surveys on behalf of the Department for
Social Security. This is the ﬁrst large-scale panel dataset in the United
Kingdom to focus on individuals around the time of their retirement. Two
waves of data were collected on a national random sample of individuals
born between 1919 and 1933. The ﬁrst wave of the survey was conducted
between November 1988 and January 1989, and collected information on
3,543 key respondents (aged 55 to 69). The key respondents include
spouses if they were in the relevant age range. In addition, information was
also collected on 609 spouses outside this age range. About two-thirds of
the original sample were reinterviewed in 1994. Eleven percent of respon-
dents disappeared in this interval due to mortality; the residual attrition is
a combination of nonresponse and (perhaps) unreported mortality.15
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14. For other studies of retirement behavior in the United Kingdom see, for example, Blun-
dell and Johnson (1998, 1999), Disney, Meghir, and Whitehouse (1994) and Tanner (1998).
15. The high attrition rate is largely due to the fact that the survey was not originally in-
tended to be a panel survey. Hence, little attempt was made to keep in touch with respondents
after the ﬁrst wave. Attanasio and Emmerson (2003) use the retirement survey to look at the
impact of wealth on morbidity and mortality, and incorporate the possibility that attrition
may be correlated with mortality.
Table 11.2 Labor market participation and beneﬁt receipt
Disability 
Full time Part time Not Public Private Disability beneﬁts plus Other 
work work working pension pension beneﬁts private beneﬁts
Men
50–54 0.6447 0.2053 0.1500 0.0000 0.0947 0.0737 0.0237 0.0658
55–59 0.4620 0.1881 0.3598 0.0000 0.3432 0.1386 0.0825 0.0728
60–64 0.2680 0.1778 0.5533 0.0000 0.5395 0.2096 0.1478 0.1237
65–69 0.0213 0.0816 0.8972 0.8121 0.7411 0.1667 0.1312 0.0532
Women
50–54 0.4667 0.2427 0.2907 0.0507 0.1040 0.0400 0.0133 0.0480
55–59 0.2936 0.2385 0.4679 0.0975 0.1988 0.0398 0.0061 0.0520
60–64 0.0909 0.1394 0.7697 0.7970 0.3606 0.0242 0.0152 0.0485
65–69 0.0156 0.0688 0.9156 0.9594 0.4125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0469
Source: Family Expenditure Survey, 1994–95.The Retirement Survey oﬀers a relatively large sample of people in the
relevant age range, compared to more general panel surveys such as the
British Household Panel Survey. It also oﬀers very rich demographic, eco-
nomic, and health information on individuals—and their spouses—in
both waves. And it has employment history information and private pen-
sion history information dating right back to individuals’ f ﬁrst jobs.16How-
ever, compared to the administrative datasets available in other countries,
the sample in the Retirement Survey is relatively small (and is reduced by
the high attrition rate between the two waves). Also, the survey does not
collect earnings history information, which is needed to calculate exact
pension entitlements for each individual. Instead, we impute earnings his-
tories on the basis of employment history information.
11.3.2 The Pension Incentive Calculations
The Basic State Pension
Calculation of basic state pension entitlement is straightforward. It de-
pends on the total number of years’ contributions and, for a married
woman, on whether she opted to pay reduced-rate National Insurance con-
tributions. This latter piece of information is known directly from the Re-
tirement Survey.
Although the basic state pension is ﬂat rate, total wealth will vary among
individuals because of the dependant’s allowance and because of the fact
that widows not entitled to a pension in their own right can claim their
spouse’s pension in full when their spouse dies. In these cases, we need to
compute husbands’ total pension wealth over the life of the couple, based
on the age diﬀerence between the spouses. Obviously, the larger the age
diﬀerence between husband and wife, the greater the husband’s total pen-
sion wealth.
Calculating State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme Beneﬁts






t   LELR 1) Rt, where W ˜
t   max(W t, UELt).
Earnings up to the annual upper earnings limit (UEL) are revalued to the
year of reaching state pension age (R) using an index of economy-wide av-
erage earnings (Y R/Y t). The lower earnings limit (LEL) in the year prior to
the individual’s reaching state pension age is deducted from each year’s
revalued earnings ﬁgure, and the net of LEL earnings are multiplied by an
YR  
Yt
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16. For a good overview of information in the Retirement Survey see Disney, Grundy, and
Johnson (1997).accrual factor ( Rt).17 For people retiring before 2000 the accrual rate was
1.25 percent a year. Details of earnings factors, upper and lower earnings
limits, and accrual rates are given in Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2001).
Having calculated earnings proﬁles for each individual in the Retirement
Survey, their SERPS entitlements are fairly straightforward to calculate.
We assume zero SERPS pension for people who are in occupational pen-
sion plans and for married women who have opted to pay reduced-rate Na-
tional Insurance contributions.
Accrual rates have changed since 2000, but this reform will not aﬀect 
the cohort of individuals in the Retirement Survey, all of whom will have
reached the state pension age before then. Finally, the fact that widows can
claim their former husbands’ SERPS pensions if they receive no pension in
their own right means that, as with the basic state pension, men’s marital
status, and the age diﬀerence between them and their spouse, also aﬀect
their total pension wealth and accrual.
Invalidity Beneﬁt
One possible way to treat entitlement to invalidity beneﬁt would be to as-
sume that only individuals who received the beneﬁt were eligible, and that
all those who satisﬁed the eligibility conditions received the beneﬁt. How-
ever, given the potential for subjective evaluation of “incapacity for work”
and “reasonable work” and in light of signiﬁcant variation in the number
of people receiving the beneﬁt over time, as well as anecdotal evidence of
diﬀerences between doctors in their willingness to certify individuals as
being incapable of work, this assumption is inappropriate. Instead, we cal-
culate an individual’s invalidity beneﬁt wealth on the basis of an assigned
probability that he or she will receive the beneﬁt. These probabilities are
derived in Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2001) from a probit model for re-
ceipt of invalidity beneﬁt as a function of characteristics such as age, edu-
cation, region, tenure, marital status, and spouse’s employment status,
which we estimate using data drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey
from April 1988 to March 1994. We impute probabilities for individuals in
the Retirement Survey on the basis of matched characteristics.
Occupational Pensions
The pension received in a deﬁned-beneﬁt occupational pension plan is
typically determined by a formula of the type:
P   (PER    LELR 1)N,
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17. From April 2000 this formula has changed. Instead of uprating annual earnings and
then subtracting the LEL from the year prior to retirement, the lower earnings limit from the
year worked is subtracted from earnings ﬁrst, then the diﬀerence is uprated in line with earn-
ings growth. Since the LEL is annually uprated in line with the Basic State Pension, that is,
with prices, this has the eﬀect of reducing the generosity of SERPS.where P is the annual occupational pension,   is the scheme-speciﬁc ac-
crual rate, PERis pensionable earnings at the time of retirement (which are
typically the individual’s average earnings in the last year, or last few years,
before retirement),   is the integration factor, and N is the number of years
that the individual has belonged to the scheme. From information in the
Retirement Survey, we know N, the number of years the individual has be-
longed to the scheme. However, we have to make reasonable assumptions
about  Rt , PER, and  .
The key distinction that we make is between individuals who work in the
public sector versus those in the private sector. We assume that diﬀerent
typical schemes apply in the two sectors with diﬀerent accrual rates, deﬁ-
nitions of pensionable earnings, and integration factors. We assume an ac-
crual rate of 1/60th for private sector and 1/80th for public sector. For pen-
sionable earnings we take the best three out of the last ten years’ earnings
for individuals working in the private sector and the best year’s earnings
out of the last ten years for individuals working in the public sector. We as-
sume an integration factor of 1 for private-sector schemes and 0 for public-
sector schemes.
11.3.3 Total Pension Wealth and Pension Incentive Measures
In the analysis of the incentive eﬀects of pensions on retirement pre-
sented in Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2001), three diﬀerent forward-
looking measures of accrual were used. The ﬁrst was simply the one-
period accrual—that is, how much an individual can add to his or her
total pension wealth by working this period. The second was peak value.
This represents the diﬀerence between total pension wealth accumulated
by the start of the period and the maximum total pension wealth an indi-
vidual could accumulate looking forward across all future years. This is a
more appropriate measure if it is assumed that labor market exits by older
workers are irreversible. In this case, when someone leaves the labor mar-
ket he or she is giving up all possible future additions to his or her pension
and will therefore consider how much he or she could increase the pension
by staying in the labor market not just this period, but in all future peri-
ods. By not retiring now, individuals retain an option to retire in the future
and, thereby, to increase their pension. This is very similar in spirit to the
option value (Stock and Wise 1990a, 1990b), which is the third measure
used.
In the option value model, individuals are assumed to compare the value
of retiring now to the maximum of the expected values of retiring at all fu-
ture ages, where the value of retiring at future ages includes both possible
pension additions and future earnings, that is,
OV   V t(r∗)   V t(t) where V t(r)  ∑
r 1
s t
 s tY s
   ∑
T
s r
 s t[kBs(r)]  ,
470 Richard Blundell and Carl Emmersonwhere Y s is earnings and Bs is retirement beneﬁts. The option value diﬀers
from the peak value by incorporating the future value of earnings until re-
tirement and by incorporating utility parameters k, the diﬀerential value of
income in leisure compared to earned income, and  , the coeﬃcient of rel-
ative risk aversion. In our calculation of option values we assume k   1.5
and   0.75. We assume a discount factor,  , of 0.97 throughout.
11.3.4 The Retirement Probability Model
A summary of the estimated retirement model results are presented in
table 11.3. These are the estimated marginal eﬀects from a probit model of
transitions into retirement. A full set of results are presented in the Ap-
pendix. This model speciﬁcation includes both an option value accrual
term as well as separate terms for pension wealth. The wealth terms relate
to the discounted present value of pension wealth for the individual whose
retirement we are modeling and that of his or her spouse. Two speciﬁca-
tions are considered in the simulations reported here. The ﬁrst relates to a
model in which there is a separate dummy variable for each age. The sec-
ond simply includes a linear age trend. The speciﬁcation of age dummies
in a retirement transition model is clearly important. These two speciﬁca-
tions provide a range of speciﬁcations over which to compare our simula-
tion results.
In each speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients on this wealth are always strongly
signiﬁcant and suggest that the restrictions underlying the standard option
value model need to be relaxed to allow saving and borrowing against fu-
ture pension wealth. If these wealth variables are excluded, the option
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Table 11.3 Estimated retirement transition models, with a full set of time dummies
and with a linear time trend only
Full set of Linear time 
time dummies trend only
Total wealth 0.0608 0.0631
(0.0164) (0.0163)
Option value –0.5145 –0.4446
(0.3476) (0.3426)
Spouse pension wealth 0.0280 0.0269
(0.0108) (0.0107)
No. of observations 1,998 1,998
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.153
Log likelihood –661.525 –697.758
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. The full set of demo-
graphic controls include earnings (and earnings squared), education, health, job tenure, in-
dustry, proportion of time spent in full-time employment, whether individual has an occupa-
tional pension, housing tenure, ﬁnancial wealth, age diﬀerence within couples, spouse’s
earnings, spouse’s health, and whether spouse is retired. See table 11A.1.value coeﬃcient becomes much larger and signiﬁcantly negative. For ex-
ample, the coeﬃcient becomes –0.903 (0.275) for the ﬁrst model that con-
tains a full set of time dummies.
In all cases, the pension wealth and option value variables are jointly sig-
niﬁcant. These results are consistent with the presence of both income and
substitution eﬀects in retirement decisions.18The positive coeﬃcient on the
total pension-wealth variable points to an income eﬀect, whereby individ-
uals who accumulate a lot in earlier years retire earlier. The impact of the
option value reﬂects forgone future opportunities from stopping working
now; the negative coeﬃcient on this term indicates that the greater those
forgone opportunities, the less likely individuals are to retire. Since the in-
centive variables are measured in €100,000, the coeﬃcient of –0.5145 on
the option value, for example, implies that a €10,000 rise in the option
value (leaving pension wealth unaﬀected) reduces the probability of retire-
ment by a little over 5 percentage points.19
The behavioral adjustments in the counterfactual simulations presented
in the next section reﬂect these estimated marginal eﬀects.
11.4 The Pension Policy Reforms and Simulation Methodology
As we have seen, each individual’s total pension wealth and pension ac-
crual measures are built up from combining four separate elements of the
pension system—the basic state pension, the State Earnings-Related Pen-
sion Scheme, occupational pensions, and disability beneﬁt.20 Here we out-
line the nature of the pension reforms and the methodology used for simu-
lation.
11.4.1 Reform 1 (Increased State Pension Age)
The ﬁrst reform concerns an increase in the state pension age for every-
one by three years. Hence, under this reform (the Three-Year Reform) the
state pension age is 68 for men and 63 for women. This means that the ba-
sic state pension and SERPS will not be received until individuals reach
this higher state pension age. As disability beneﬁts can currently be re-
ceived until the state pension age, we also increase the age until which in-
dividuals can claim these beneﬁts by three years.
We also augment the normal occupational pension retirement ages by
three years. There is clearly a correspondence in practice between the state
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18. The option value and total pension wealth measures are in €100,000s while net earnings
are in €1,000s.
19. It is worth noting that the option value is signiﬁcant and slightly larger in size for men,
as is also shown in the Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2001) study. However, it is much less pre-
cisely estimated for women. In our simulations, we chose to use the combined sample results
as presented in table 11.3.
20. We ignore income support, since it is a universal beneﬁt.pension ages and the normal retirement ages in occupational pension
plans, so increasing the state pension could be expected to have such a
knock-on eﬀect on occupational pension plans. Moreover, the increases in
life expectancy that, in part, might cause the government to reduce the gen-
erosity of the state pension system could have a similar eﬀect on occupa-
tional schemes.
11.4.2 Reform 2 (Common Reform)
The second reform assumes a pension system of the following ﬁve com-
ponents: (a) an early entitlement age of 60, (b) a normal retirement age of
65, (c) a 60 percent replacement rate at age 65, (d) a 6 percent actuarial ad-
justment from 60 to 70, and (e) no other pathways to retirement.
Under this reform we replace the current state pension system with this
revised state pension system and remove the possibility of individuals re-
tiring onto any other sources of income—that is, we remove means-tested
support, disability beneﬁts, and existing, private occupational pension
schemes.
This system is considerably more expensive to the treasury than the ex-
isting UK state pension system. This can be shown by the fact that enti-
tlement to a full basic state pension is worth approximately 15 percent of
average earnings with entitlement to the SERPS at most around 30 per-
cent of average earnings (since it provides 20 percent of earnings between
a lower and an upper threshold, with the former worth about 15 percent
of average earnings and the latter set at around 150 percent of average
earnings21). However, it should be noted that this reformed system is not
more generous to all individuals. This is because it removes the possibility
of retiring onto means-tested income support or disability beneﬁt (inva-
lidity beneﬁt). In the base system, those who reach retirement with no or
little other income will be eligible for means-tested income support, which
essentially tops-up their income to that of the social security safety net. In
addition, those able to meet the health criteria will be able to receive the
ﬂat-rate invalidity beneﬁt (which, prior to April 2001, was not means
tested) on top of any other occupational pension income that they might
have.
In addition, higher-income individuals might also lose from this re-
formed system, since it is assumed that the more generous state system will
replace occupational pensions (both public and private). Hence, those
whose occupational pension plan provides a replacement rate more gener-
ous than this reformed state scheme will lose out. For example, those in a
private-sector occupational pension plan are assumed to have an accrual
rate of 1/60—therefore, someone with 40 years of service would receive a
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21. These are known as the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) and the Upper Earnings Limit
(UEL), respectively.replacement rate of 40/60   2/3 (integrated with the basic state pension),
which is greater than the 60 percent oﬀered at age 65 under reform 2. Those
who retire before 65 will be entitled to even less under the reformed system.
Those in public-sector occupational pension plans were assumed to have
an accrual rate of 1/80, but not integrated with the basic state pension. This
means that whether someone with 40 years of service is better oﬀunder the
reformed system will depend on whether the 60 percent replacement rate
is greater than 50 percent of his or her ﬁnal salary (i.e., 40/80) plus the ba-
sic state pension.
11.4.3 Reform 3 (Modiﬁed Common Reform)
The other chapters in this volume present an Actuarial Reform in ad-
dition to the Common Reform and the increase in the state pension age.
The purpose of this is to investigate the ﬁscal implications of making the
actuarial adjustment approximately fair without changing either the nor-
mal retirement age or the average generosity of the system. This proposed
system is, however, not relevant to the United Kingdom, as the existing
UK state pension system pays beneﬁts from the state pension age regard-
less of whether the individual has retired. It is not possible to claim state
pension beneﬁts prior to the state pension age. Currently, individuals can
choose to defer receiving beneﬁts if they wish, but this decision is purely
an investment decision, as it can be made independently of whether to un-
dertake paid employment. Hence, rather than increasing the generosity
of the deferral payment, we instead estimate the ﬁscal impact of an alter-
native reform that is strongly based on the Common Reform (reform 2),
but modiﬁed to bring it slightly more into line with the base UK pension
system.
Under this modiﬁed common reform the state pension system still oﬀers
a replacement rate of 60 percent at age 65 (with the same accrual structure
as under reform 2), but it also has a ﬂoor on beneﬁts equal to the basic state
pension and a ceiling set at the higher threshold, above which additional
employee National Insurance contributions are not paid.22 In addition,
both means-tested income support and disability beneﬁt are retained until
age 60. As a result, only high-income individuals can be worse oﬀunder re-
form 3 compared to reform 2 (due to the fact that under reform 3, maxi-
mum pension income is capped). Furthermore, the retention of means-
tested income support will mean that low-income individuals cannot be
worse oﬀ under reform 3 than they are under the base system, since retired
low-income individuals will be able to receive means-tested income sup-
port until age 60 and then a state pension worth at least the basic state pen-
sion from this age onward.
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22. Known in UK parlance as the Upper Earnings Limit.11.5 Eﬀect of Policy Reforms
This section uses the estimated retirement transition models described
in section 11.3 to model the impact of each of the reforms set out in sec-
tions 11.4.1, 11.4.2, and 11.4.3 on retirement ages and the government’s ﬁ-
nances. This impact is then separated into the mechanical impact of the re-
form, namely, that which would arise if retirement ages were ﬁxed, and the
behavioral impact of the reform; that is, the ﬁscal implications of any mod-
eled change in retirement ages. We then turn to examine the distributional
impact of each of the reforms. Additional tables of results—directly com-
parable to those in other chapters—can be found in the Appendix (tables
11A.2, 11A.3, and 11A.4).
11.5.1 Retirement Ages and Fiscal Implications of Reform 1, Using a
Retirement Model with a Full Set of Age Dummies
The eﬀect of raising the state pension age is to reduce the median level of
total pension wealth and to increase option values, compared to the exist-
ing pension system. The income and substitution eﬀects work in the same
direction; the combined eﬀect is to reduce the conditional probability of re-
tirement at younger ages. The precise magnitude of the eﬀect of reforming
the state pension system depends on which speciﬁcation is used. When a
full set of age dummies is included these tend to dominate any of the pen-
sion wealth and accrual incentives, and the eﬀect of reforming the pension
system appears to be very small. To the extent that the age dummies pick
up the incentive eﬀects, these would need to be adjusted to reﬂect the piv-
otal ages in the new system. Under the base system, with a full set of age
dummies included, the mean retirement age is estimated at 63.1.
The ﬁrst reform, which increases the state pension age for both men and
women by three years, is estimated to increase this to 63.5 if the estimated
age eﬀects are assumed to be unchanged by the reform. Under the alterna-
tive assumption, that the reformed system would lead directly to a shift in
the estimated age eﬀects, this rises to 64.9. Figure 11.3, panel A, shows the
estimated distribution of retirement ages under both of these assumptions
compared to the estimated distribution in the base pension system. This
shows that the distribution of retirement ages under the base system and
under reform 1, when the estimated age eﬀects are held constant, are very
similar, although the reform does lead to slightly fewer retirements be-
tween 56 and 60 (inclusive) and more retirements occurring between 62
and 70 (inclusive). As expected, when the reform is also assumed to shift
the estimated age eﬀects, this leads to larger diﬀerences in the distribution
of retirement ages. The spikes in the base system that occurred at 60 and 65
(which are the state pension ages for women and men, respectively) now
occur at 63 and 68.
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Fig. 11.3 A, The distribution of retirement ages under the base system and reform
1, using an option value model and a full set of age dummies; B, Net expenditure
under the base system and reform 1, by age of retirement, using an option value
model and a full set of age dummies; C, Gross expenditure under the base system
and reform 1, by age of retirement, using an option value model and a full set of age
dummies; D, Income tax, National Insurance Contribution, and VAT receipts under
the base system and reform 1, by age of retirement, using an option value model and
a full set of age dummies.
Note: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model, see section 11.3
BIncreasing the state pension age would lead to a lower level of expendi-
ture on the state pension. The increase in retirement ages would also lead
to an increase in government revenues, arising from increased income tax
and national insurance contributions. Both of these would lead to lower
levels of government borrowing (or larger government surpluses) than un-
der the base system. This impact, at least in part, will be oﬀset by increased
state spending on both means-tested income support and disability bene-
ﬁt. This is because these can both be received until the state pension age,
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Fig. 11.3 (continued)
C
Dand therefore under the reformed system can be received for up to three ex-
tra years.
Estimates of the government expenditure and government revenues
from these sources under both the base system and under reform 1 are pre-
sented in table 11.4. Under the base system, expenditure on the state pen-
sion to this cohort of individuals is estimated to be €24.7 billion. Under the
reformed system (assuming no change in the estimated age eﬀects) this is
reduced by 24.2 percent to €18.7 billion. As we will show later (in section
11.5.4) this comprises a slightly larger mechanical eﬀect, arising from the
increase in the state pension age, oﬀset slightly by an increase in some in-
dividuals’ entitlements to the SERPS, arising from the increased average
retirement ages.
The net reduction in spending on the state pension is partially oﬀset by
a large increase in expenditure on disability beneﬁt (invalidity beneﬁt) of
40.7 percent and a tripling in expenditure on means-tested income support
(an increase of 200.3 percent). Overall, state expenditures are still reduced
by 12.1 percent. Under the alternative assumption, that the increase in the
state pension age also shifts the estimated age eﬀects, the savings from re-
duced expenditure on the state pension are reduced. This is because the
larger upward shift in retirement ages leads to higher expenditure on the
SERPS than when the age eﬀects are held ﬁxed. As a result, the reduction
in net state pension spending is smaller than in the model when the age
eﬀects are not shifted by the full three years. The smaller reduction in state
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Table 11.4 Total ﬁscal impact of reform 1—option value model with a full set of age dummies
Percent change 
€ (in millions) on base system
Reform 1 Reform 1 Reform 1 Reform 1
Base (no age shift) (age shift) (no age shift) (age shift)
State pension 24,733 18,741 19,739 –24.2 –20.2
Invalidity beneﬁt 2,619 3,685 3,671 40.7 40.2
Income support 765 2,297 1,470 200.3 92.2
Total spending 28,117 24,723 24,881 –12.1 –11.5
Employee National Insurance 5,354 6,427 6,758 20.0 26.2
Employer National Insurance 7,045 7,457 8,261 5.8 17.3
Income tax 28,156 29,755 33,130 5.7 17.7
Value added tax 10,637 10,660 11,716 0.2 10.1
Total tax 51,192 54,299 59,866 6.1 16.9
Net expenditure –23,075 –29,576 –34,985 28.2 51.6
Net change as % of 
gross base beneﬁts n.a. n.a. n.a. –23.1 –42.4
Note: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model see section 11.3; n.a.   not applicable.pension spending is almost entirely oﬀset by a larger reduction in expendi-
ture on means-tested income support. In particular, shifting the age eﬀects
by three years reduces the amount of additional spending on income sup-
port. Overall expenditure under the model with the shift in age eﬀects is
11.5 percent lower than under the base case, compared to the 12.1 percent
lower found when the age eﬀects are held constant.
Turning to the impact of increasing the state pension age on government
receipts: this reform will also have both a direct and an indirect impact.
The direct impact will be through increased employee National Insurance
contributions on earnings, as these will now be paid up to the higher state
pension age (there is no corresponding direct impact on employers’ Na-
tional Insurance contributions, as these are levied on the earnings of indi-
viduals aged both below and above the state pension age). There will also
be a direct eﬀect that will lead to reduced income tax receipts levied on
both state and private pension income due to the increase in the pension
age. Similarly, there will be a direct impact from reduced VAT receipts, aris-
ing from the lower social securityspending.23The indirect impact of reform
1 arises as a result of the increased average retirement age. This will in-
crease income tax and employees’ and employers’ National Insurance con-
tributions. Table 11.4 shows that in the base system, total government re-
ceipts from these taxes are estimated at €51.2 billion. This estimate
comprises employees’ National Insurance contributions of €5.4 billion,
employers’ National Insurance contributions of €7.0 billion, income tax
receipts of €28.2 billion, and VAT receipts of £10.7 billion. The table shows
that total revenues from these four taxes exceed total spending on means-
tested income support, disability beneﬁt, and state pension. This means
that the excess revenues are essentially being used to pay for other items of
public expenditure or to reduce public debt.
We ﬁnd that under reform 1, assuming no change in the estimated age
eﬀects, employee national insurance is increased by 20.0 percent. The in-
crease in employer national insurance is smaller, at 5.8 percent, which is
not surprising, since this is only from the indirect impact of an increased
average retirement age, discussed previously. The increase in income tax re-
ceipts is smaller still, at 5.7 percent. Increased income tax receipts under
reform 1 show that the direct impact of lower receipts on pension income
is more than oﬀset by the impact of an increased average retirement age.
Overall income tax, national insurance, and VAT revenues are estimated to
be 6.1 percent higher.
Under the alternative assumption, that the increase in the state pension
age would also shift the estimated age eﬀects by a full three years, we ﬁnd
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23. The standard rate of VAT in the United Kingdom is currently 17.5 percent. But because
some items, such as food, books, and newspapers are zero rated and domestic fuel is rated at
5 percent we set VAT equal to 10 percent of net incomes.that government revenues from each of these three sources would be fur-
ther increased. This is due to the larger increase in average retirement ages
that occurs under this assumption. Overall, income tax, VAT, and national
insurance revenues would be 16.9 percent higher than under the base sys-
tem, compared to the 6.1 percent found earlier.
The overall impact on the government’s ﬁnances from the items modeled
is also presented in table 11.4. Under the base system, there is a net surplus
of €23.1 billion. This is increased by 28.2 percent, to €29.6 billion under the
model where the age eﬀects are held ﬁxed. It is increased by 51.6 percent, to
€35.0 billion under the model where age eﬀects are, by assumption, fully
shifted by three years. In part, these percentages are inﬂated by the fact that
they are being compared to the net surplus. However, the ﬁscal gains to the
treasury are also large when compared to gross expenditures. Under the
model with no shift in the estimated age eﬀects, the increase in the net sur-
plus of €6.5 billion represents 23.1 percent of gross expenditure. Under the
model with a full three-year shift in the estimated age eﬀects, the increase in
the net surplus of €11.8 billion represents 42.4 percent of gross expenditure.
The reduction in net expenditure (increase in net surplus), disaggregated
by age of retirement, is shown in ﬁgure 11.3, panel B. Under the base sys-
tem, there is an overall net expenditure from the state on those who retire
before age 58. This is because the expenditure and revenues are calculated
over ages 56 to 77, and therefore taxes on earnings from those who retire
this early will often be low (or for those who retire at 56, zero). Net expen-
diture peaks at age 65—this is not due to those retiring at this age being
particularly expensive to the state, but due to the fact that 65 is the most
common retirement age (as shown in ﬁgure 11.3, panel A). Under reform
1, the pattern of net expenditures varies by the assumption that is made to
the interpretation of the age eﬀects. Under the assumption that there is no
shift in the estimated age eﬀects, the pattern of net expenditure is quite sim-
ilar to that observed in the base system, although there is, unsurprisingly,
a particularly large reduction in net expenditure (i.e., an increase in the net
surplus) among those who retire at age 65. Under the assumption that the
estimated age eﬀects are shifted by the full three years, the spike at 65 is
shifted to age 68.
The estimated impact on the budget of an increase in the state pension
age can also be disaggregated into the impact on gross expenditures and
the impact on gross government revenues. This is shown in ﬁgures 11.3,
panels C and D. The spike in gross expenditures occurring at age 65 is re-
duced under the assumption that the age eﬀects are ﬁxed, and is reduced
and moved to age 68 under the assumption that reform leads to a shift in
the age eﬀects by three years. Turning to government revenues—under the
ﬁrst assumption, the revenue received from those retiring at age 65 is in-
creased, and under the second assumption, it is both increased and shifted
to age 68.
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Using a Retirement Model with a Full Set of Age Dummies
Under both reform 2 and reform 3, the median level of total pension
wealth is increased. The income eﬀect from these reforms will therefore
tend to reduce retirement ages. The substitution eﬀect will tend to work in
the opposite direction, with state pension rights being increased by 6 per-
cent for each year of additional work between 60 and 70. This is in con-
trast to being employed under the base system, where the basic state pen-
sion and the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme become payable at
the state pension age regardless of whether an individual has actually re-
tired. The option value eﬀect is reinforced in reform 2 by the absence of
any nonpension beneﬁts (such as disability beneﬁts) before retirement age
under the simulated reform, which increases the incentive to stay in work.
In both reform 2 and reform 3, the overall eﬀect on retirement behavior is
to lead to an increase in the average retirement age. Under the base sys-
tem, this is estimated to be 63.1, under reform 2 it is estimated to be 64.6,
and under reform 3 it is estimated to be 63.9. The fact that average retire-
ment ages are closer in reform 3 to the base system than in reform 2 is per-
haps not surprising, as the reform 3 system is, by design, closer to the base
system.
The estimated distribution of retirement ages under both reform 2 and
reform 3 are shown in ﬁgure 11.4, panel A, alongside those arising from the
base system. Under all three systems, the most common retirement ages
are 60 and 65. This corresponds to the state pension ages for women and
men, respectively, in the base pension system. These spikes are the result of
the estimated age eﬀects from the base pension system and therefore could
be expected to change under the reformed system. Reform 2 leads to lower
retirement rates at all ages up to 63 (inclusive) and correspondingly higher
retirement rates up to age 76. The large fall in retirements prior to age 60 is
unsurprising, as under reform 2 they would receive no pension income un-
til they reached 60. Turning to reform 3: for all ages between 56 and 73, the
retirement rates under reform 3 are estimated to be between those under
the base system and those under reform 2. Again, this is to be expected,
given the design of the system.
Both reform 2 and reform 3 represent more generous and therefore more
expensive state pension systems than the existing UK pension system. This
is shown in table 11.5. Total state expenditure is estimated to be €73.5 bil-
lion under reform 2 and €81.8 billion under reform 3, compared to €28.1
billion under the base system. Under reform 2, this increase in spending is
due to a large increase in spending on the state pension, which is partially
oﬀset by the fact that there is no spending on means-tested income support
or disability beneﬁt. Under reform 3, spending on state pensions is even
higher than under reform 2. This shows that the cap on state pension
Fiscal Effects of Reforming the UK State Pension System 481income under reform 3 does not reduce spending suﬃciently to ﬁnance the
(re-) introduction of a ﬂoor on pension beneﬁts equal to the basic state
pension. In addition, under reform 3, disability beneﬁt (invalidity beneﬁt)
and means-tested income support are retained for those who retire before
age 60. This leads to lower disability beneﬁt expenditure than in the base
system (as under reform 3, men aged 60 to 64 will no longer be able to claim
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Fig. 11.4 A, The distribution of retirement ages under the base system, reform 2
and reform 3, using an option value model and a full set of age dummies; B, Net ex-
penditure under the base system, reform 2 and reform 3, by age of retirement, using
an option value model and a full set of age dummies.
A
Bit), but higher levels of means-tested income-support spending (which is
due to those retiring before 60 having no other pension income and there-
fore falling onto income support, being enough to more than oﬀset the fact
that people will not be eligible from 60 onward.
Turning to government revenues, both reform 2 and reform 3 lead to
higher levels of government receipts. Revenues from employers’ national
insurance are increased by 15.4 percent as a result of the increase in aver-
age retirement ages. Employees’ National Insurance receipts are increased
by 22.6 percent. This is higher than the estimated increase in employers’
National Insurance receipts because of women in paid employment having
to pay employees’ National Insurance contributions up to age 65 under the
reformed systems (compared to the state pension age for women of 60 un-
der the base system). Income tax receipts are increased even more sub-
stantially—this larger increase being due to more income tax being paid on
the more generous state pension system. The increase in revenues under re-
form 2 is larger than the increase under reform 3. This is due to the earlier
average retirement age under reform 3 and the fact that the ceiling on tax-
able state pension beneﬁts reduces receipts. The reintroduction of disabil-
ity beneﬁt and means-tested income support does not increase income tax
receipts, as these sources of income are not taxable, while those who only
receive a pension income equal to the ﬂoor of the basic state pension will
also not have to pay any income tax (this is because their income will not
be suﬃcient to take them above the income tax personal allowance). The
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Table 11.5 Total ﬁscal impact of reforms 2 and 3—option value model with a full set
of age dummies
Percent change 
€ (in millions) on base system
Base Reform 2 Reform 3 Reform 2 Reform 3
State pension 24,733 73,498 80,087 197.2 223.8
Invalidity beneﬁt 2,619 0 731 –100.0 –72.1
Income support 765 0 954 –100.0 24.7
Total spending 28,117 73,498 81,772 161.4 190.8
Employee National Insurance 5,354 6,828 6,561 27.5 22.6
Employer National Insurance 7,045 8,546 8,128 21.3 15.4
Income tax 28,156 41,769 40,590 48.3 44.2
Value added tax 10,637 17,102 16,593 60.8 56.0
Total tax 51,192 74,245 71,872 45.0 40.4
Net expenditure 23,075 747 9,901 96.8 n.a.
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts n.a. n.a. n.a. 79.4 117.3
Notes: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model see section 3. Given the move
from net surplus to a net deﬁcit under reforms 2 and reform 3 it is not possible to express the
change in net expenditure as a percentage. n.a.   not applicable.increase in spending on the state pension, and the increase in retirement
ages, also leads to a substantial increase in estimated VAT receipts.
The overall impact on the government’s ﬁnances from the items modeled
is also presented in table 11.5. Under the base system, there is a net surplus
of €23.1 billion. Under reform 2, this leads to the system being just in bal-
ance (surplus of £0.7 billion), and under reform 3, a large deﬁcit of €9.9 bil-
lion. The cost to the treasury of reform 2 would be €22.3 billion, or 79.4
percent of gross expenditure. The cost of reform 3 would be €33.0 billion,
or 117.3 percent of gross expenditure.
A breakdown of net expenditure by the age at which individuals retire is
provided in ﬁgure 11.4, panel B. Comparing reform 2 to the base system,
we see that the reformed system is more expensive to the treasury at all re-
tirement ages prior to age 67, with net expenditure being similar thereafter.
Reform 2 is particularly more expensive at ages 60 and 65, as shown by the
diﬀerence between the reform 2 and base system bars at these points. These
are the modal retirement ages for women and men, respectively. Figure
11.4, panel B also shows that reform 3 has a greater budgetary cost than re-
form 2, at all retirement ages.
11.5.3 Retirement Ages and Fiscal Implications of Reforms 1, 2, and 3,
Using a Retirement Model with a Linear Age Model
All of the analysis so far has looked at retirement ages and the ﬁscal im-
pact of diﬀerent reforms using a retirement model containing a full set of
age dummies. This section performs the same analysis but with the more
parsimonious retirement model that only allows for a linear age trend. The
estimated retirement ages under the base system, and each of the three re-
forms, is shown in ﬁgure 11.5, panel A. Under the base system, the model
retirement age is estimated to be 63 and the pattern of retirement ages
diﬀers substantially from the more ﬂexible model that used a full set of age
dummies (and was shown in ﬁgure 11.3, panel A). The changes in retire-
ment ages caused by each of the reforms are all in the same direction as es-
timated in the model using a full set of age dummies. Under the base sys-
tem, the average retirement age is estimated to be 63.2 (compared to 63.1
found under the model with a full set of age dummies). Reform 1 leads to
an increase in average retirement age to 63.5, which is exactly the same as
found using the previous model with no shift in the estimated age eﬀects
(using a model with an age shift led to an increase to 64.9). Reform 2 is es-
timated to increase the average retirement age to 64.2, while reform 3 is es-
timated to lead to a slightly smaller increase, to 63.7. These compare to the
64.6 and 63.9 ages found using the ﬁrst retirement model.
The ﬁscal impact of these reforms, using the linear age retirement model,
is summarized in table 11.6. Despite the very diﬀerent distribution of re-
tirement ages shown in ﬁgure 11.5, panel A, compared to 11.3, panel A,
and 11.4, panel A, the estimated ﬁscal impacts are very similar to those ob-
484 Richard Blundell and Carl Emmersontained when using the retirement model with a full set of age dummies. Re-
form 1 is estimated to reduce total state spending by 13.4 percent and to in-
crease government revenues by 4.7 percent. This compares to a saving of
12.1 percent and an increase of 6.1 percent found using a full set of age
dummies and not shifting the age eﬀects (presented in table 11.3). Under
reform 2, expenditures are estimated to increase by 167.1 percent and tax
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Fig. 11.5 A, The distribution of retirement ages under the base system, reform 1,
reform 2, and reform 3, using an option value model and a linear age term; B, Net
expenditure under the base system and reform 1, by age of retirement, using an op-
tion value model and a linear age term.
A
Brevenues by 37.4 percent (compared to 161.4 percent and 45.0 percent
shown in table 11.5), while under reform 3 expenditures are estimated to in-
crease by 195.7 percent and tax revenues by 34.4 percent (compared to
190.8 percent and 40.4 percent, as shown in table 11.5).
Figure 11.5, panel B breaks down this net expenditure by the age of re-
tirement. This does give a very diﬀerent picture to that shown for reform 1
in ﬁgure 11.3, panel B and reforms 2 and 3 in ﬁgure 11.4, panel B. This is
caused by the very diﬀerent pattern of retirement ages estimated using a
linear age trend (and shown in ﬁgure 11.5, panel A) compared to those
found when using a full set of age dummies (and shown in ﬁgures 11.3,
panel A and 11.4, panel B). The large cost of reforms 2 and 3 still arises
from those retiring before age 67.
11.5.4 Decomposing the Fiscal Implications of Reforms 1, 2, and 3
The ﬁscal impact of each of the reforms that has been described in sec-
tions 11.5.1 to 11.5.3 can be broken down into two components. First, the
ﬁscal impact that would arise if the reformed system were introduced but
individuals did not change their retirement behavior (the mechanical
eﬀect). Second, the ﬁscal impact that arises due to individuals changing
their retirement behavior (the behavioral eﬀect). This section presents
these two breakdowns for each of the three reforms and each of the two re-
tirement models discussed so far.
The ﬁscal impact of the ﬁrst reform is decomposed into these two eﬀects
in table 11.7. The ﬁrst set of rows take the retirement model with a full set
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Table 11.6 Total ﬁscal impact of reforms 1, 2, and 3—option value model with a linear age trend
only
Percent change on base system
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
State pension –24.0 194.7 220.1
Invalidity beneﬁt 48.6 –100.0 –75.0
Income support 171.7 –100.0 32.2
Total spending –14.4 167.1 195.7
Employee National Insurance 18.9 20.8 17.4
Employer National Insurance 4.4 14.6 10.3
Income tax 4.2 40.0 37.4
Value added tax –1.1 54.3 51.2
Total tax 4.7 37.4 34.4
Net expenditure 24.0 n.a. n.a.
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –23.4 137.7 169.6
Note: Given the move from net surplus to a net deﬁcit under reforms 2 and reform 3, it is not possible to
express the percentage change in net expenditure. n.a.   not applicable.of age dummies and where the estimated age eﬀects are held ﬁxed. Under
this model, reform 1 was estimated to reduce state expenditure by €3.4 bil-
lion. The mechanical eﬀect is found to reduce spending by €3.9 billion,
with the increase in retirement ages leading to a relatively small oﬀset in ex-
penditure of €0.5 billion. This small increase is mainly due to an increase
in state pension spending, as individuals retire later and therefore accrue a
larger entitlement to the SERPS. On tax receipts, it is the mechanical eﬀect
of the reform that is relatively small, at €0.1 billion. This is due to increased
employee National Insurance receipts arising from the increase in the state
pension age, which is slightly oﬀset by lower income tax receipts on the re-
duced state pension beneﬁts. The behavioral part of the ﬁscal impact
works in the same direction as the mechanical eﬀect, due to increased tax
receipts from the increase in average retirement ages. This is estimated to
increase revenues by €3.0 billion.
The second set of rows show the mechanical and behavioral eﬀects using
the retirement model with the full set of age dummies and shifting the esti-
mated age eﬀects by the full three years. By deﬁnition, the mechanical
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Table 11.7 Decomposition of the total eﬀect of reform 1
Mechanical Behavioral Total
Full age dummies, no age shift
Total expenditure (€)  3,894 500  3,394
Total taxes (€) 95 3,012 3,107
Net change (€)  3,989  2,512  6,501
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts 17.3 10.9 28.2
Net change as % of gross 
base beneﬁts –14.2 –8.9 –23.1
Full age dummies, with age shift
Total expenditure (€)  3,894 658  3,236
Total taxes (€) 95 8,579 8,674
Net change (€)  3,989  7,921  11,910
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts 17.3 34.3 51.6
Net change as % of 
gross base beneﬁts –14.2 –28.2 –42.4
With linear age trend
Total expenditure (€)  3,976 247  3,729
Total taxes (€) 132 2,522 2,654
Net change (€)  4,108  2,275  6,383
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts 15.7 8.7 24.4
Net change as % of gross 
base beneﬁts –14.8 –8.2 –23.0
Note: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model see section 11.3.eﬀect of this reform is exactly the same as under the previous model. The
larger increase in retirement ages leads to larger behavioral eﬀects. The in-
crease in state expenditures from the behavioral response to the reform is
still relatively small at just €0.7 billion. This is due to the fact that for many
individuals, extra years of employment will not increase their entitlement
to state pensions—for example, because they are opted out of the SERPS,
or if the extra years of work do not add to their best twenty years. The be-
havioral component of the ﬁscal impact is estimated to be larger on tax re-
ceipts. This is because the larger increase in retirement ages increases
receipts from National Insurance contributions, income tax, and VAT
revenues. The third set of rows of table 11.7 show the decomposition using
the retirement model with a linear age trend. These are quite similar to the
model with no shift in the estimated age eﬀects.
The decomposition of the ﬁscal impact of reforms 2 and 3 under each of
the retirement models is presented in table 11.8. As with reform 1, the be-
havioral impact of the reforms is found to be relatively larger in the retire-
ment model with the full set of age dummies than in the model that only
uses a linear age trend. This is due to the estimated increase in retirement
ages accruing under reforms 2 and 3, being larger in the former model.
Looking at state expenditure under reform 2, it is clear that the mechan-
ical impact of the reform is only very slightly oﬀset by its behavioral impact.
The fact that the very large increase in the generosity of the state system im-
plied by this reform is only slightly oﬀset by individuals retiring slightly
later is unsurprising. With tax receipts, the behavioral impact of the reforms
is found to be relatively more important, and as with reform 1 they are
found to both operate in the same direction—namely, to increase revenues.
Under reform 3, the mechanical component of the ﬁscal eﬀect of the re-
form on both state spending and tax receipts is estimated to be larger than
under reform 2. This reﬂects the fact that reform 3 is, on average, more gen-
erous than reform 2. The behavioral component of the ﬁscal eﬀect on both
state spending and tax receipts is estimated to be smaller. This reﬂects the
smaller increase in average retirement ages occurring as a result of reform
3. Hence with regards to state expenditures, the behavioral components of
the ﬁscal eﬀect of reform 3 are very small relative to the mechanical com-
ponent. On tax receipts, both eﬀects are still very important, and continue
to operate in the same direction.
11.5.5 Distributional Impact of Reforms 1, 2, and 3
The microdata used in this analysis can also be used to examine the dis-
tributional impact of each of these potential reforms. This data calculates
each individual’s total expected pension wealth under the base system and
under each of the three reforms. An alternative calculation would be to
take the individual’s incomes in each of the three reforms. However, this
seems inappropriate, since a reform such as an increase in the state pension
488 Richard Blundell and Carl Emmersonage might lead to individuals remaining in work longer, and therefore re-
ceiving a higher income, but they would prefer the unreformed system, in
which they could retire earlier.
Individuals are then placed in wealth quintiles on the basis of the wealth
in the base system according to two diﬀerent equivalence scales. The ﬁrst
assumes that to have the same standard of living, couples need two-thirds
more wealth than a single individual. The second simply places one ﬁfth of
single individuals and one ﬁfth of couples in each quintile. Essentially, this
latter equivalence scale assumes that a couple at the 80th percentile of the
wealth distribution of couples is as well oﬀ as a single person at the 80th
percentile of the wealth distribution of single individuals.
Fiscal Effects of Reforming the UK State Pension System 489
Table 11.8 Decomposition of the total eﬀect of reforms 2 and 3
Mechanical Behavioral Total
Reform 2, full age dummies
Total expenditure (€) 47,807 –2,426 45,381
Total taxes (€) 10,642 12,411 23,053
Net change (€) 37,165 –14,837 22,328
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts –161.1 64.3 –96.8
Net change as % of gross 
base beneﬁts 132.2 –52.8 79.4
Reform 2, with linear age trend
Total expenditure (€) 47,994 –1,651 46,343
Total taxes (€) 11,173 6,847 18,020
Net change (€) 36,821 –8,499 28,322
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts –141.0 32.5 –108.5
Net change as % of gross 
base beneﬁts 132.7 –30.6 102.1
Reform 3, full age dummies
Total expenditure (€) 54,374 –719 53,655
Total taxes (€) 11,947 8,733 20,680
Net change (€) 42,427 –9,451 32,976
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts –183.9 41.0 –142.9
Net change as % of gross 
base beneﬁts 150.9 –33.6 117.3
Reform 3, with linear age trend
Total expenditure (€) 54,381 –111 54,270
Total taxes (€) 12,500 4,627 17,127
Net change (€) 41,881 –4,738 37,143
Net change as % of net 
base beneﬁts –160.4 18.1 –142.2
Net change as % of gross 
base beneﬁts 151.0 –17.1 133.9
Note: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model see section 11.3.The concern with this latter equivalence scale is that it might overstate
the well-being of single individuals, since we know that, on average, older
single people are poorer than older couples. However, as this section will
show, the distributional results do not seem to be sensitive to the choice of
either of these equivalence scales. Once individuals are placed in wealth
quintiles according to their wealth and family size under the base system,
the total amount of wealth in each quintile is estimated. This is then com-
pared to the total amount of wealth in each base quintile under each of the
reformed systems. Working out the distributional impact in this way, rather
than taking the average change in wealth observed across individuals, is de-
signed to make our results less sensitive to any outliers, which is a particu-
lar concern given our relatively small sample sizes.
The distributional impact of each of the reforms using the simple equiv-
alence scale is presented in table 11.9. Table 11.10 shows the distribu-
tional results, assuming that one ﬁfth of single individuals and one ﬁfth of
couples are in each quintile.
Reform 1, which increases the state pension age, unsurprisingly leads to
lower levels of average pension wealth. Under the retirement model with a
full set of age dummies without any shift in the estimated age eﬀects, the re-
form leads to average losses across the top three wealth quintiles. This com-
pares to no average loss in the poorest two wealth quintiles. This is caused
by the availability of means-tested income support and disability beneﬁt,
compensating many of those who are out of work, who do not have a
private pension.
Shifting the age eﬀects leads to quite diﬀerent distributional eﬀects,
with those in the poorest two quintiles suﬀering average losses. This is be-
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Table 11.9 Distributional impact of the reforms, measured by the percent change in
pension wealth, using a simple equivalence scale
Quintile (%)
System and retirement model 1 (poorest) 2 3 4 5 (richest) All (%)
Reform 1
Full age dummies, no age shift –0.2 0.4 –5.3 –10.4 –6.7 –5.9
Full age dummies, with age shift –13.5 –14.1 –13.6 –13.6 –9.9 –12.2
Linear age trend only 12.6 7.8 0.2 –8.0 –5.5 –2.2
Reform 2
Full age dummies 202.8 35.3 19.2 –19.6 –5.9 13.7
Linear age trend only 209.7 48.3 18.9 –18.5 –8.0 15.0
Reform 3
Full age dummies 261.0 65.1 38.4 5.2 –1.5 32.1
Linear age trend only 268.0 76.5 41.0 5.4 –3.3 33.6
Note: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model see section 11.3.cause many individuals are now assumed to retire later as a result of the
reform. This means that entitlements to means-tested income support and
disability beneﬁt will be reduced (which are included in the estimates of
pension wealth, whereas earnings are not). The results from the retire-
ment model that includes only a linear age trend are quite diﬀerent. These
suggest that in fact, on average those in the poorest two wealth quintiles
will gain from the reform. However, this feature arises simply from the fact
that under this model, many of these individuals estimated to be employed
and under the reformed system will be able to continue to accrue an addi-
tional entitlement to the SERPS when the state pension is increased. In
practice, this appears to be an unreasonable estimate, as demonstrated by
the diﬀerence in estimated retirement rates shown in ﬁgures 11.3, panel A,
and 11.5, panel A.
Table 11.9 and table 11.10 also show that under reform 2, individuals are,
on average, better oﬀ than under the base system. This is due to large in-
creases in the pension wealth of those in the poorest three wealth quintiles,
and in particular, very large gains among those in the poorest quintile.
Those in the top two wealth quintiles actually lose, on average. These
diﬀerences are caused by the fact that individuals with higher pension
wealth under the base system will be more likely to have a private pension,
which they will lose under the reformed system. These distributional re-
sults are invariant to the choice of retirement model.
Under reform 3, the average gains across the whole population are larger
than under reform 2. On average, all of the quintiles gain from this reform,
compared to reform 2. This is because the retention of the basic state pen-
sion, means-tested income support, and disability beneﬁt are worth more
to each quintile than the fact that the earnings-related component of the
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Table 11.10 Distributional impact of the reforms, measured by the percent change in pension
wealth, keeping one-ﬁfth of singles and couples in each quintile
Quintile (%)
System and retirement model 1 (poorest) 2 3 4 5 (richest) All (%)
Reform 1
Full age dummies, no age shift 0.9 –1.0 –4.6 –9.8 –7.0 –5.9
Full age dummies, with age shift –14.4 –14.4 –12.9 –12.7 –10.5 –12.2
Linear age trend only 12.6 6.9 0.6 –7.8 –5.7 –2.2
Reform 2
Full age dummies 188.6 37.3 16.9 –18.5 –6.9 13.7
Linear age trend only 199.3 44.6 18.6 –19.0 –7.8 15.0
Reform 3
Full age dummies 239.2 68.2 36.3 6.0 –2.1 32.1
Linear age trend only 248.5 76.7 40.0 4.5 –2.7 33.6
Note: For details of the speciﬁcation of the retirement model see section 11.3.state pension is now capped. On average, compared to the base system, the
richest quintile still loses. Again, these distributional results are invariant
to the choice of retirement model.
11.6 Summary and Conclusions
The focus of this chapter has been the evaluation of the ﬁscal and dis-
tributive impact of social security pension reform in the United Kingdom.
We have considered three reforms to the state pension system that are all
designed to increase the retirement age by changing the incentive structure
underlying the pension system. The ﬁrst increased the pension age by three
years, the second introduced an actuarial adjustment to retirement before
65 and after 65, allowing deferral to age 70. It also eliminated all other
pathways to retirement. The ﬁnal reform adapted the second reform to in-
clude a cap and a ﬂoor so as to more closely mirror the existing state pen-
sion scheme in the United Kingdom.
The simulations show that increasing the state pension age would lead
to a lower level of expenditure on the state pension. The increase in retire-
ment ages would also lead to an increase in government revenues, arising
from increased income tax and national insurance contributions. In par-
ticular, employee National Insurance receipts would increase, since they
would be payable to new increased state pension age. The increase in re-
ceipts and reduction in state spending would lead to lower levels of gov-
ernment borrowing (or larger government surpluses) than under the base
system. At least in part, this impact will be oﬀset by increased state spend-
ing on both means-tested income support and disability beneﬁt.
As age eﬀects are so central to any microeconometric model of retire-
ment transitions, the detailed simulation results were presented for diﬀer-
ent speciﬁcations. For reform 1, in which the state pension age is increased,
the important contrast in these diﬀerent speciﬁcations was whether the age
dummies were held ﬁxed or allowed to shift in line with the reform. For the
ﬁrst reform, the overall expenditure under the model with the shift in age
eﬀects is 11.5 percent lower than under the base case, compared to the 12.1
percent lower found when the age eﬀects are held constant. We also ﬁnd
that, assuming no change in the estimated age eﬀects, employee National
Insurance is increased by 20.0 percent. Overall, income tax, national in-
surance, and VAT revenues are estimated to be 6.1 percent higher. Under
the alternative assumption that the increase in the state pension age would
also shift the estimated age eﬀects by a full three years, we ﬁnd that gov-
ernment revenues from each of these sources would be further increased.
This is due to the larger increase in average retirement ages that occurs un-
der this assumption. Overall, tax and National Insurance revenues would
be 16.9 percent higher than under the base system, compared to the cur-
rent 6.1 percent.
Both reform 2 and reform 3 represent considerably more generous and
492 Richard Blundell and Carl Emmersontherefore more expensive state pension systems than the existing UK pen-
sion system. Under reform 2, this increase in spending is due to a large in-
crease in spending on the state pension, which is partially oﬀset by the fact
that there is no spending on means-tested income support or disability
beneﬁt. Under reform 3, spending on state pensions is even higher than un-
der reform 2. This shows that the cap on state pension income under re-
form 3 does not reduce spending suﬃciently to ﬁnance the (re-) introduc-
tion of a ﬂoor on pension beneﬁts equal to the basic state pension. In terms
of government revenues, both reform 2 and reform 3 lead to higher levels
of government receipts.
Appendix
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Table 11A.1 Retirement transition models, with a full set of time dummies and with a linear time
trend only
Full set of time dummies Linear time trend only
Variable Men Women Men Women
Total wealth 0.0608 0.0631
(0.0164) (0.0163)
Option value –0.5145 –0.4446
(0.3476) (0.0326)
Spouse pension wealth 0.0280 0.0269
(0.0108) (0.0107)
Net earnings –0.0039 –0.0021
(0.0047) (0.0046)
Net earnings2 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Partners net earnings –0.0066 –0.0068
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Partner’s net earnings2 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Female dummy 0.1252 0.9176
(0.1611) (0.2186)
Age diﬀerence –0.0042 –0.0065 –0.0038 –0.0064
(0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0022) (0.0039)
Job tenure 0.0000 0.0028 0.0005 0.0028
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Percent full-time employment 0.0535 0.0214 0.0461 0.0284
(0.0380) (0.0403) (0.0377) (0.0405)
Education dummy –0.0210 –0.0088 –0.0188 –0.0191
(0.0196) (0.0248) (0.0199) (0.0235)
Health score 0.0228 0.0230 0.0196 0.0206
(0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0095) (0.0107)
Partner’s health score –0.0090 –0.0201 –0.0110 –0.0176
(0.0067) (0.0123) (0.0068) (0.0122)
(continued)Table 11A.1 (continued)
Full set of time dummies Linear time trend only
Variable Men Women Men Women
Renter –0.0177 –0.0053 –0.0165 –0.0057
(0.0223) (0.0306) (0.0225) (0.0306)
Mortgage –0.0357 –0.0293 –0.0366 –0.0289
(0.0202) (0.0226) (0.0203) (0.0229)
Industry
Engineering 0.0525 –0.0382 0.0482 –0.0439
(0.0433) (0.0438) (0.0423) (0.0415)
Manufacturing –0.0006 n.a. 0.0039 n.a.
(0.0373) n.a. (0.0379) n.a.
Distribution –0.0053 0.0398 0.0059 0.0328
(0.0343) (0.0704) (0.0365) (0.0675)
Services –0.0540 –0.0310 –0.0500 –0.0400
(0.0246) (0.0446) (0.0259) (0.0429)
Government –0.0122 –0.0070 0.0090 –0.0176
(0.0407) (0.0597) (0.0467) (0.0551)
Spouse retired 0.0688 0.1170 0.0756 0.1069
(0.0395) (0.0550) (0.0396) (0.0534)
Occupational pension 0.6049 0.0290 0.060 0.0148
(0.0252) (0.0372) (0.0245) (0.0350)
£1–£3,000 wealth 0.0235 –0.0119 0.0246 –0.0016
(0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0302) (0.0328)
£3,000–£10,000 wealth 0.0358 0.0339 0.0361 0.0435
(0.0371) (0.0457) (0.0369) (0.0480)
 £10,000 wealth 0.0233 –0.0326 0.0325 –0.0226
(0.0390) (0.0330) (0.0403) (0.0366)
Missing wealth 0.0414 –0.0480 0.0672 –0.0445
(0.0613) (0.0373) (0.0659) (0.0401)
Linear age term n.a. n.a. 0.0305 0.0211
n.a. n.a. (0.0042) (0.0054)
Age
57 0.0298 –0.0218 n.a. n.a.
(0.1187) (0.0590) n.a. n.a.
58 0.0003 0.0010 n.a. n.a.
(0.0956) (0.0642) n.a. n.a.
59 0.0134 –0.0096 n.a. n.a.
(0.1013) (0.0592) n.a. n.a.
60 –0.0031 0.1961 n.a. n.a.
(0.0916) (0.1102) n.a. n.a.
61 0.1024 0.1247 n.a. n.a.
(0.1001) (0.1010) n.a. n.a.
62 0.0142 0.0713 n.a. n.a.
(0.1016) (0.0937) n.a. n.a.
63 0.0980 0.1270 n.a. n.a.
(0.1420) (0.1182) n.a. n.a.
64 0.1365 0.0997 n.a. n.a.
(0.1595) (0.1256) n.a. n.a.Table 11A.1 (continued)
Full set of time dummies Linear time trend only
Variable Men Women Men Women
65 0.5369 0.4000 n.a. n.a.
(0.2002) (0.1816) n.a. n.a.
66 0.2555 0.5152 n.a. n.a.
(0.2157) (0.3772) n.a. n.a.
67 0.3585 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.2382) n.a. n.a. n.a.
68 0.2615 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.2455) n.a. n.a. n.a.
69 0.4353 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.2655) n.a. n.a. n.a.
70 0.7241 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.2226) n.a. n.a. n.a.
No. of observations 1,998 1,998
Pseudo R2 0.197 0.153
Log likelihood –661.525 –697.758
Notes: Marginal eﬀects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. n.a.   not applicable.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 11A.4 Distributional analysis: Option value—Linear age (S1)
Change relative to base
Present discounted value
Three-Year Common Modiﬁed
Base Three-Year Common Modiﬁed Reform Reform Reform
Quintile 1 (highest)
After-tax income 13,512 12,748 12,463 13,141 –764 –1,049 –371
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –5.7 –7.8 –2.9
Quintile 2
After-tax income 7,848 7,232 6,360 8,199 –615 –1,487 352
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts –7.8 –19.0 4.9
Quintile 3
After-tax income 6,217 6,254 7,371 8,705 37 1,155 2,488
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 0.6 18.6 39.8
Quintile 4
After-tax income 4,340 4,640 6,275 7,667 300 1,934 3,327
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 6.9 44.6 71.7
Quintile 5 (lowest)
After-tax income 2,290 2,579 6,853 7,981 289 4,563 5,691
Change as % of 
base beneﬁts 12.6 199.3 220.7500 Richard Blundell and Carl Emmerson
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